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Parliamentary Privilege Vs Constitutional Supremacy 
Berenger v Jeewoolal 
1. JNTRODUCTION 
3 
The case of Berenger v Jeewoola/
1 was heard by the Supreme Court of Mauritius in 
1998. It provides an interesting insight into the operation of the doctrine of 
parliamentaiy p1ivilege within a legal system governed by a written Constitution. It is 
also an illustration of the development of a distinct area of Commonwealth 
jurisprudence dealing with constitutional matters. 
Mauritius was originally part of the British Commonwealth before gammg 
independence in 1968. Like many British colonies, the newly independent Government 
accepted a shift away from the British tradition of a flexible unwritten constitution, and 
a written Constitution was put in place with the status of supreme law. In Mauritius, as 
in a number of other former British territories, this has led to some conflict with the 
traditional common law constitutional rules, particularly the doctrine of absolute 
parliamentary privilege. 
This paper will centre on the approach of the Supreme Court of Mauritius to this 
conflict, clearly outlined in Berenger by Chief Justice Pillay. This approach has its 
origins both in Mauritiai1 case law ai1d in similai· decisions in other Commonwealth 
countries. Comparison will be made with the traditional common law position and with 
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different approaches that have developed elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The formal 
and substantive eiements of the reasoning wiil be discussed and the underlying policy 
foundations of Pillay CJ's limited alteration of the Common Law will be discussed. 
2. BERENGER V JEEWOOLAL 
2.1 The Facts 
Berenger (the appeilant) was the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly of 
Mauritius. Jeewoolal (the respondent) was the Speaker of the National Assembly. 
During a sitting of the National Assembly, Berenger attempted to raise a point of order 
against a decision of Jeewoolal, who had let a member of the government speak on a 
privilege matter contrary to Standing Order 74(1 ). Jeewoolal refused to rule on the point 
of order. While Berenger attempted to raise the point again members of his party 
shouted "shame" at Jeewoolal. Jeewoolal ejected one of them. Berenger called out 
"shame, shame on you" and led a walk out of bis party.2 
Once Berenger had left, JeewoolaJ put a motion to the Assembly that Berenger be 
suspended. The motion was passed. A week later, Berenger agam attended the 
Assembly. He attempted lo bring a point of order during a speech by the Prime 
Minister. He was stopped by Jeewoolal and asked to withdraw from the Assembly. He 
refused and was removed by force from the house without explanation.
3 
1 Berenger v Jeewoo/al [ 1999] 2 MR 172 (Supreme Court ofMawitius) 
2 Berenger. above. J 72- J 73. 
5 
2.2 The Claims 
Berenger claimed that he was not notified of his suspension or of the reasons for his 
ejection from the house. He also claimed that Jeewoolal ' s decision prevented ms sitting 
in the National Assembly was illegal, was in breach of the Standing Orders and 
prevented him from fulfilling his "constitutional duties" as Leader of the Opposition .4 
He sought a motion declaring the Speaker' s decision to prevent him attending to be 
"illegal, null and void, ultra vires, in breach of the Standing Orders and Rules of the 
National Assembly 1995 and ... a gross abuse of power". 5 He also asked for a motion 
declaring him to not be suspended and for any other motions the court deemed 
appropriate. He had earlier obtained injunctive relief to allow him to sit in the ational 
Assembly pending the determination of the main action. 6 
Jeewoolal responded with five objections to the claims. These are outlined on page 175 
of the judgment and can be summarised easily. He argued that: the claim should be 
against the National Assembly not the Speaker; that the Court has no jurisdiction as it 
concerned the internal proceedings of the National Assembly; that to consider the 
application would breach the principle of separation of powers; that it was statutorily 
prevented7 and that even if the court did have jurisdiction there had been no breach of 
the Standing Orders. 8 
3 Berenger. abo\'e, 173. 
4 Berenger, above, I 73-174. 
5 Berenger. abo\'e. 172. 
6 Berenger v Jeewoola/ 11 9991 MR 57. 
7 The relevant statutory pro\ ision is the National Assembly (Pri\'ilege. [mmunities and Powers) Act 1953 
s.3 . 
8 Berenger v Jeewoolal [I 999 1 2 MR 172, 175. 
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The Attorney-General was asked to intervene by the judges "in order to enlighten tms 
Court" and was represented by the Parliamentary Counsel in the hearing. 9 Despite the 
extensive statements of claim and response, the Court found that the case could be 
decided with reference to just three of the respondent's counter-claims: that the court 
had no jurisdiction to intervene in the internal matters of Parliament; that it breached 
the separation of powers; and that it was statutorily prevented. 
2.3 The Court's Reasoning 
The Court for the case comprised three members of the Supreme Court of Mauritius: 
Pillay CJ, Yeung Sik Yuen SPJ and Matadeen J. Chief Justice Pillay delivered the 
judgment of the Court. The Court' s judgment takes the unusual step of following the 
usual summary of facts and party' s arguments by stating "what this application is not 
concerned with". 10 Pillay CJ then proceeds to outline seven areas that the application is 
not concerned with. This is an attempt by the court to narrow the argument to the 
specific point at issue. 
He asserts that the application does not concern : the constitutionality of the Standing 
Orders in question, an alleged infringement of the applicant's constitutional rights, an 
alleged breach of freedom of speech, a request for constitutional determination of the 
appellant's membership, any question that the appellant is not the Leader of the 
9 Berenger. abO\e. 174. 
10 Berenger, above, l 75 . 
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Opposition, any allegation of unconstitutionality of the suspension or any breach at all 
of the appellants constitutional rights. 
11 He also comments that
12 
... learned counsel for the applicant. hima;elf. ... candidly admitted that the basis of his clients 
application is that the applicant was suspended \\~lhout any motion to that effect having been 
made beforehand by any member of the Assembly. m breach of Standing Order 49(1). 
The appellant/applicaI1t was therefore aslcing the cou..i-t to interfi re in th proceedings of 
Parliament due to a breach by the Speaker of a Standing Order, where no breach of the 
Constitution has occurred. 
I raving clearly stated the application the court answers it immediately in the negative. 
Pillay CJ commenis ihai given ihal: 13 
the at1onaJ Assembly has the constitutional authority to suspend any of its members to 
maii,tain the orderly conduct of its proceedings a,,d :hat the applicant has no constitutional 
peg on \Yhich to ha,,g his complaint ... ,,.-e consider that th rnle of th.i court stops here. 
Having orne io the conclusion that it has no jurisdiciion, the Court pro eeds to provide 
evidence to substa.iitiate its finding. In order to provide evidence for its stand it uses two 
main sources, the Common Law of Great Britain and cases argued in similar 
Commonwealth countries on the extent of parlia1nentary privilege. from these it 
11 Berenger. above. l 75-177. 
12 Berenger. above. 177. 
13 Berenger. abO\·e. 178. 
----
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reaches the conclusion that "All the authorities from Commonwealth countries support 
our stand, whether or not they have a written constitution".
14 
2.4 The Common Law position in the United Kingdom 
The court starts its consideration of the nature of parliamentary privilege by elaborating 
the classical common law position. The basis of the common law position is found in 
Article 9 of the Bill Of Rights of 1688, which states "(T)bat the Freedom of Speech and 
Debates or Proceedings in Parlyement ought not to be impeached or questioned in any 
court or place out of Parlyement".15 This provision was intended to remedy a particular 
problem facing Parliament namely "the assertion by the King' s Court of a right to hold 
a Member of Parliament criminally or legally liable for what is said and done in 
Parliament". 16 However, as the case law has developed it has become clear, as Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson comments, iliat "there is a long line of authority ... of which Article 
9 is merely one manifestation, viz, that the Courts and the Parliament are astute to 
recognise their respective constitutional roles".
17 Parliament legislates while the court 
adjudicates and each is independent of the other. 
2.4.1 Bradlaug/1 v Gossett18 
The classic British common law case concerning the right of Parliament to discipline 
one of its members is the 19th century case of Bradlaugh v Gossett. This case is quoted 
14 Berenger. aboYe. 178. 
15 The Bill of Rights 1688, art 9, United Kingdom. 
16 Prebble v Television New Zealand Lid 11 9941 3 ZLR I. 8 (PC). 
17 Prebble. above. 8. 
18 Rradlaugh v Gossett. [l884J 12 QBD 271. 
--
-• 
ID 
----
Iii 
--
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extensively on pages 179-180 of Berenger. In this case Bradlaugh, a duly elected 
member of the House of Commons for Northampton, was prevented from taking his 
oath of office and was excluded from the parliament buildings unless he would agree 
not to take the oath. He took a claim to the Court of the Queens Bench to have the order 
declared void. 19 
The court unanimously rejected his claim, citing the cases of Burdett v Abbott and 
Stockdale v Hansard to support the proposition that "what is said or done within the 
walls of parliament cannot be inquired into within a court of law".20 Part of the 
reluctance of the court seemed to flow from the possibility that if the Court could 
intervene it "might in many supposable cases end in the privileges of the Commons 
being decided by the Lords".21 Both Judges were keen to believe that the reasons for the 
Commons preventing the oath were reasonable. However, Lord Coleridge went as far as 
to comment that even if Bradlaugh was being unjustly prevented from taking an oath 
that he was legally entitled to "it is not a matter into which this Court can examine, if 
injustice has been done, it is injustice for which the Courts oflaw afford no remedy".
22 
The Court did accept that there was a role for the Court in determining whether 
parliament did indeed have a privilege, but as soon as a privilege was established the 
Court could have no power to inquire into its exercise. This was especially true of 
privileges exercised within the walls of parliament. 
19 Bradlaugh. abo\'e, 271-272. 
20 Bradlaugh, above, 275. 
21 Bradlaugh. above. 275. 
22 Bradlaugh. above, 277 . 
• 
• • -
Id 
----• 
lO 
TI1e Court' s decision in Bradlaugh remains good law in the United Kingdom. It was 
endorsed by the House of Lords in the case of British Railways Board v Pickin where 
Lord Wilberforce commented that "the remedy for a Parliamentary wrong, if one has 
been committed, must be sought from Parliament and cannot be gained from the 
courts".23 The rule in Bradlaugh was adopted by the Privy Council as the law in New 
Zealand in the case of Prebble v Television New Zealand.
24 
2.5 Constitutional Considerations 
The Supreme Court of Mauritius accepts that the Common Law position is that there is 
a total bar on the Court inquiring into any aspect of the exercise of parliamentary 
privilege. However, this is not the end of the matter in the Mauritian context. Unlike the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, Mawitius has a written Constitution that has status 
as supreme law. This means that "the principle (of parliamentary privilege) must of 
course be read within the context of the constitution".
25 To allow Parliament unfettered 
jurisdiction to resolve matters relating to its internal proceedings would possibly allow 
Parliament to act in breach of the constitution. 
The danger in allowing parliament complete control of internal proceedings 1s 
acknowledged by the Supreme Cornt. Pillay CJ in a concise summaiy states that: 
20 
the classical position that the Courts of the Commonwealth have adopted is that they can 
determine the existence or a parliamentary pri,ilege, in our case that of suspension. but \Viii 
23 British Railways Board v Pickin j 1974] AC 765, 793 (HL). 
24 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd I I 9941 3 NZLR I. 
25 Berenger vJeewoo/a/ 1199912 MR 172. 179. 
--
--
-
Id 
-
Id 
-
bi 
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II 
not inquire into the exercise of that privilege. unless it results in a breach of the Constitution 
itself, in countries like Mauritius that have a written Constitution. 
The Court takes the common law position and adapts it to the different legal framework 
found in Mauritius. Although it changes the common law approach, Pillay CJ is careful 
to only alter the position to the extent necessary to protect constitutional right. This 
position is based on a number of cases, one of which is from Mauritius, with the 
remafoder coming from other similar Cmnmonwealth jurisdictim1s, in particular Tm1ga, 
Papua New Guinea and Jersey. These countries have similar constitutional structures 
and the decisions of their courts have been reported in the Law Reports of the 
Commonwealth series. 
2.5.1 Fotojili and Others v Siale 21 
The first case used by the Supreme Court to justify intervention on the grounds of a 
breach of the Constitution is the Tongan case of Fotofili. In this case a member of the 
Tongan Legislative Assembly (Siale) challenged the payment of parliamentary 
allowances that be believed some members were not entitled to. The members accused 
argued that it was a matter of parliamentary privilege and the court did not have any 
jurisdiction. 28 
In the process of deciding whether the Privy Council (in respect of Tonga) had 
jurisdiction, Sir Clinton Roper made a number of important statements concerning the 
26 Berenger, above, 179. 
27 Fotoftli and Others v Sia le. 11988 I LRC 102. (PC - Tonga). 
28 Fotofili , above. I 04. 
• --
bi 
-----
---
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12 
impact of a written Constitution on the common law doctrine of parliamentary 
privilege. He came to the conclusion that 29 
if on the true construction of the Constitution, some event or circumstance 1s made the condition 
of the authentic will of the legislature, or otherwise the validity of the supposed law, it follows 
that the question ,, hether the eYent or circumstance has been met is examinable m the Court. 
While this comment applies to the passage of a Bill through Parliament, it is equaJly 
applicable to a parliamentary disciplinary measure that contravenes a constitutional 
protection. In effect it goes further as it allows the court to examine whether a law 
passed is actually the valid will of the legislature if a breach of the Constitution has 
occurred during its procurement. This is very different to the position in Pickin where 
the House of Lords refused to inquire into an Act procured by fraud.30 This is 
acknowledged by Sir Clinton Roper who commented that "(t)he position is then that the 
Assembly of Tonga, and indeed any parliamentary body based on a written 
Constitution, does not have the privilege of supremacy over the Courts enjoyed in the 
United Kingdom".3 1 
2.5.2 Attorney-General v Ramgoolam 32 
The second case used to justify limited intervention by the Court is an earlier Mauritius 
case Attorney General v Ramgoo/am. However in this case, the Court was actually 
acting with specific authority to intervene in the internal proceedings of parliament via 
29 Fotofili. above, I 04. 
30 British Railways Board v Pickin 119741 AC 765. 793 (HL). 
31 Foto/ili. above, LOG. 
32 Auo~ney-General v Ramgoolam [ 1993 J MR 81 (Supreme Court of Mauritius). 
---------------
1111 
lJ 
article 37(1) of the Constitution of Mauritius. This article allowed the legislature to 
apply to the Supreme Court to declare a seat in National Assembly vacant. In this case 
the application was based on article 35( 1 )( e ), which allowed the stal lo be declared 
vacant if a member had been absent without leave of the Speaker for a period of more 
than three months. 33 
The facts are quite different to Berenger as this was an application where "the 
Constitution has conferred on the Supreme Court a fundamentai jurisdiction concerning 
Constitutional matters unknown to the Courts in the United Kingdom".34 Pillay CJ notes 
lhis wht:n ht: comments lhal in Lhis cast lht: Cuw·i lrn<l "a clear man<lalt" w1<lt:1 iht: 
Constitution. 35 
As the ju1isdiction of the Court was dear under the Constitution, the Supreme Court in 
Ramgooiam couid have stopped at this point. It did not. Tne court decided to make a 
number of obiter comments on the wider powers of the court to review the intemai 
proceedings of Pariiament. it considered that the doctrine of pariiamentary priviiege 
was3G 
... bound to be relati-1,e in cow1tries hl.e ours u1 the ne\\ Co1rnnorn\ealth. We ha~e adopted \\fitten 
Constitutions \vith entrenched proYisions conferring on the judiciary, among a wide Ya.riety of 
other jurisdictional powers. the O\'erail control of constitutionality. whether with regards to the 
funciions performed by the iegisiaiure or the executive. 
33 Ramgoo/am. aboYe. 82. 
"
1 Ramgooiam, above. 82-83 
35 Berenger v Jeewoola/ 119991 2 MR 172. 180. 
36 Ramgoolam. above. 84. 
-----------------
14 
The tone of the Court is clearly assertive in stating its power to ensure compliance with 
the Constitution. Some of this may stem from the facts of the case where political 
machinations by one party had resulted in an attempt to have an opposition MP 
removed via some underhand tactics. 
2.5.3 MaJ,a v Kipo 37 
The third case used by the Court to support its position is another Commonwealth case, 
this time from Papua New Guinea. This case is particularly pertinent as the facts are 
similar in some respects to the facts in Berenger. The Supreme Court of Papua New 
Guinea was asked to make a ruling on a breach of Standing Orders made in a meeting to 
elect the Premier of a Province. The Court came to the firm conclusion that it could not 
do so.38 Woods J ruled that39 
(T)he Court can inquire into the constitutional provisions such as the initial matters of the ·way 
that the Assembly was convened and by whom but when it gets to the actual operations of the 
Standing Orders this Court cannot investigate the actual compliance or not v,ith the Standing 
Orders as these are matters for the Assembly. 
Interestingly, the Com1 did not consider the situation that would occur if there was a 
breach of a member's constitutional right as well as a breach of a Standing Order, 
although the judgment indicates that if a constitutional issue was raised the court would 
assu.._'Tie ju...risdiction. 
37 Maha v Kipo II 996J 2 LRC 328 (Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea). 
• • • • • • 
.. 
Using this approach the Court declared one of the meetings held to be unconstitutional 
due to a failure to follow the constitutional guidelines; but declined to investigate any 
breach of Standing Orders. It held that the Court ''cannot investigate, comment or 
criticise the conduct of that meeting, governed as it was by the Standing Orders".
40 
The 
policing of the Standing Orders is a matter for Parliament not the Courts. This same 
principle is noted in Berenger by Pillay CJ, who points out that Standing Order 49(8) of 
the Mauritius National Assembly provides a means for members to proceed against 
other members, even when there has been no actual breach of a Standing Or<ler.
41 Such 
actions are to be pohced by Parliament not the Courts, in the absence of any 
constitutional issues. 
2.5.4 Syvret v Bllillaclte 42 
The final significant case relied upon by Pillay CJ in his judgment is the Jersey case of 
/:'Jyvret v Bail/ache. This is also a case with some similarities to the facts of Berenger. 
This case was taken by a Jersey Senator against the Bailiff a..'1d Deputy Bailiff of the 
..... tates cf Jersey (the legislature). The Senator had been suspended after refusing to 
withdraw unsubstantiated allegations of abuse of po·tver against another Senator. I Ie 
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . ,n -- . . .. -
was suspenctect untll ne woulct w1tnctraw tne comment anct apologise. ·- He -·appllect tor 
judicial review of the rulings claiming that they had been made ultra vires, contra..1 to 
natural justice and in bad faith ".
44 
38 A.tfcd,1n, "'lhrn ro.. 1:")Q_ 1.1.n . 
39 Maha, abo,·e, 33 l . 
40 Maha. above. 331 . 
41 Berenger v Jeewoo/a/ j 1999] 2 MR 172, 182. 
4
" Syvret v Hail/ache 119991 LRC 645 (Royal Court - Samed1 D1ns1on). 
J, Syvre1. above, 654-656. 
4-1 Berenger, aboYe, I 84 
• 
Id 
16 
This case provides an interesting comparison with Berenger as Jersey Jacks a written 
constitution. This means that the court has a more limited role in adjudicating disputes 
involving parliamentary privilege. Thjs was immediately noted by the Commissioner, 
who commented that "in my judgment ill am satisfied that the matters complained of 
do relate to the internal regulation of the States, I cannot interfere and must decline 
jurisdiction".45 He accepts the approach of Bradlaugh that while a court may inquire 
into the e)cistence of a privilege, once it has determined that one exists, it may not 
inquire into its exercise. Interestingly, he specifically finds that "this principle in my 
judgment applies not only to the United Kingdom Parliament but to any legislative 
assembly. Even when such an Assembly is exclusively established by statute ... ".
46 He 
supports this statement with reference to Fotofili and Maha. 
The conclusion reached by the Commissioner is the same as that in both Maha and 
Berenger. He decided that "it is not for the Court to consider whether such Standing 
Orders were properly interpreted or applied, or whether such historic privileges or 
inherent powers have been properly exercised".
47 In addition to this conclusion, two 
other interesting points are raised by this case and its treatment by Pillay CJ in 
Berenger. The first is the use by both the Commissioner and Pillay CJ of the judgment 
of the Canadian Supreme Court in Speaker of the House of Assembly v Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation.48 Tms important case will be considered in detail below as 
an alternative approach to the decision of the Court in Berenger. 
45 Syvret. above, 658. 
46 Syvrer, abO\·e. 668. 
41 ,'>J!\Jret. above. 670. 
48 Speaker of 1he House ofAssembly v Canadian Broadcasling Commission ( 1993) 100 DLR ( 4th) 213 
(Supreme Court of Canada). 
• 
• 
l7 
The second important point is the adoption by Pillay CJ of the policy reasons cited by 
the Com.missioner in Syvrei. 49 Piliay CJ quotes extensively from !::,yvret, adopting with 
approval the six pollcy grounds for non-intervention used in the judgment. The six 
reasons can be neatly summa..rised: 
1. The legislature is the central organ of democrati'"' gvveuuu'"'ut and should be 
completely independent. 
2. .lAJlo\.ving appeals to the CoLL.1: 'vvould prevent the function of the legislature 
embroiling me?nbers in constant !ega1 proceedings. 
3. Both the judiciary and the legislature need to be completely independent so as to 
corrunand respect. 
A 
""T. Judicial abstention ti"Am ..l.JV.l..ll of parliamentar; proceedings \.Vill ensure 
parliamentary abstention from judicial proceedings. 
5. A legislat1uc cw.1 provide its ovvn remedies for injust]ce. 
, • ~ . • • • • • . . . . • . • •. • • . . 'iO 
o. An arrectea memoer nas tne ummate ngm to appeal to ms or ner electorate.-
th.o-ra. 
Lll\,,,J\,., ·~ ~
"' u 
Tl.a 
.11.1\., 
e:nphasis is clearly' on the necessity for parlirunenta..J' independence in all but the tnost 
49 Berenger v Jeewoo!a/ 119991 2 MR 172_ 184-185. 
50 Syvrei, abo, e, 683. 
• 
-------
----
!R 
2.5.5 The National Assembly (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 
The :final reason cited in the judgment of Pillay CJ to justify judicial non-intervention is 
S.3 of the National Assembly (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act. This section 
states that "(N)o civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against the Speaker or 
any member for words spoken before .. . the Assembly or any eomrnittee, or by reason 
of an matter . .. broughi by him in the Assembly" .~ 1 He comments that S.352 
... gi,·es statutory effect to the general principle. indicated already. that the ationa! Assem.bly has 
privilege over its intcrm:J proceedings and, in particular. the pfriJege of maintaining order in the 
Assembly and makes it abundantly clear that no action shall lie against the respondent or any 
member of the Assembly, for that rr.atter. in respect of what is said and done by him \\~thin the 
wa!!s of the National Assembly in the protection of its pri\'ileges. 
Having dealt with this final point Pil!ay CJ upholds three of t.l:ic objections of the 
defendant: the Com1 lacks jurisdiction; the claim is statutorily ban·ed; and the claim 
breaches the doctrine of separation of powers found in the Constitution. The other two 
objections of the respondent were not addressed. 
2.6 Pacific Cases 
The cases used in the judgement of Pillay CJ to justify his findings are only a selection 
of the decisions that have occurred recently in Commonwealth com1tries. For example, 
in the Pacific Islands over the past decade there have been a number of cases that have 
·,National Assembly (Privilege, Immunities and Powers) Act J 953 s.J 
~1 Berenger, abu,e. l85-l86. 
]9 
taken a similar approach to that of the Supreme Court of Mauritius. Unlike the cases 
referred to by Pillay CJ , these cases have a lower profile and have not been reported in 
major law reports such as the Law Reports of the Commonwealth. These cases further 
illustrate the evolution of a r-mmnonwealth approach to this issue. 
2.6.1 D(lnny Phillip v Tlte Spe(lker oftlte Nation(lf Assembly
53 (Solomon Islands) 
This case heard by the High Court of the Solomon Islands also concerns a challenge to a 
Speaker's ruling on a Standing Order. The applicant had submitted a motion of no 
confidence to the Speaker. A Minister raised a point of order under Standing Order 
36(3) Clm.m1"ng thn4- such a mo,.;on could no'" b A ~,.,. n n f-h A ; nn ,o~ hn,.:I h~~~ ~n;n ~ ,.:i n4- 4-J...~ al IJ ll . l l V pul a.:, UJ\,,, 1.:,:>U\., 11au VC,\..,Jl lU.l;:)\.JU Ul u.1.;;.. 
previous meetL~g. The Speaker quashed the applicant's motion. The applicai*lt appealed 
to the court arguing that the Speaker' s ruling on the Standing Order was ultra vires as it 
breached the Constitution; he asked thal lhe tnotion be reir1slate<l. -
4 
Ward CJ approached the matter from the perspective that "the privileges of parlia1nent 
in the United Kingdom are part of our Jaw having been brought from the Common Law, 
insofar as they do not conflict with the Constitution'·.
55 The Court came to the 
conclusion that it did not have any general right to intervene when the Speaker ruled on 
matters of procedure under the Standing Orders. He stated that'
6 
53 Danny Phillip v The Speaker of the National Parliament I I 990] SILR 227 
54 Danny Philip. abo\'c. 227-232. 
55 Danny Philip. abo,e. 234. 
'
6 Danny Philip. above, 239. 
-.. 
20 
\\foist the Court \,·ill ne, er shirk from its duty to remedy any breach or infringement of 
constitutional rights of any person even if it requires an enquiry into the internal proceedings of 
parliament, it will only do so for the limited purposes of S.83 and in such a way as to reduce a.TJy 
potential conflict between institutions. 
The Court would onJy intervene where the action of the Speaker had breached a 
constitutional right of the claimant. In this case, while the Speakers decision was not 
ultra 
rnnchh1hnnol 
,._,V.J.JJl..l.l.UL.JV.1_.I_U.J 
it was 
right. 
wrong, and this prevented the applicant from exerc1smg a 
Tl1e Cou..rt reinstated the motion. The facts of tPJs case are ' ' ,13""' 1 Y'-'.l) 
similar to Berenger except m this case the Speakers exercise of power did breach a 
constitutional rigi1.t. The approach of the Cow-t is identical, intervening in parlia1ncntary 
proceedings only to the extent necessary to protect constitutional rights. 
2.6.2 Re Articie 6 (i) (b) ofiile Co11stiiutio11!i7 (Niue) 
This also concerns a 1n.otion of no confidence. J\ rnomhor n-f tho J. .I.. JJ.J.'-'J.J.J.V'-'.l VJ L11'-' I1no A c,c, omh lu J. ,JU.'-' J. \..JJ'-'11JVJJ 
gave notice to the Speaker of an intention to move a vote of no confidence under article 
C. I 1 \ / J... \ ~+ +J...~ 
V \l/ \U/ Vl 1111,., Constitution. The motion was accepted by the Speaker despite 
1ne1nber refusing to disclose the na.Ties of t11e four 1nembers supporting him, as 
.-1"',.., 
UH., 
1ey_u;11,d under the article. The Premier applied to the IIigh Court of Niue for a 
<lt:daratiun lhal lht: motion of nu cunfi<lt:nl:t: was uHra virt:s un<lt:r artidt: 6. 
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The Speaker' s defence ,vas to question the jurisdiction of the Cou...rt using article 24 of 
the Constitution. This article states that "neither the Speaker nor any member or officer 
.. of the Niue Assembly in whom powers are vested for the regulation of procedure 
::,liaii iu 1eiaiiun lu lhe exe11.;1::,e uy him uf any uf lhu::,e puwt:1::, ut: ::,uujcd lu ihe 
Junsdiction of any Court". 59 This provision is quite different to those considered in 
other cases as it gives parliamentary privilege a constitutional status. The immunity of 
the Speaker is a constitutional guarantee not a statlrtory or common law guara..itee. This 
compiieation is side st'-'ppcd by'" L1.c Co1rrt, vvhich catc-goriscs the application -as 
concetn1ng the interprermion of the co11stitution not an examination of the internal 
proceedings of parliament. However Di lion CJ does comment that the Courts "principal 
duty ... is to uphold the Constitution"60 and this is why Article 24 cannot inhibit the 
Court fro1n interpreting th_e constitution. 
This case does w11ta;11 considerable factual differences to Berenger, but the 
fondruucnta1 approach remains the same. The cvurt's first duty -is to u-phold t.½.e 
constitution even if this requires intervention in the parliamentary process. In this case 
the intervention occurs to preserve the constitution although there are constitutional 
provisions designed to prevent such an action. 
Both of these cases illustrate the development of a 'Commonwealth' approach. 
IIowever they also illustrate that this approach is being signifi.ca...tly influenced by the 
availability of judgments and materials. All the judgments used in Berenger were 
rep011ed in the Law Reports of the Commonwealth series, while the case of Danny 
Phillip was not reported, and not used in Berenger despite its similar facts. This is an 
51 Re Article 6 (J) (b) of rhe Consrirurion (10 No\'ember t 994) High Court of Niue (Ci, it Di, ision) 
C5!/94. 
58 Re Article 6 (I) (h). above. 1-2. 
S<l The Constitution ofNme article 24(2). 
60 Re Article 6 (I) (h) . abO\·e. 3. 
----
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illustration of the effect that the availability ofreports, and the choice of judgements to 
be included in those reports, can have on the development of the law. 
3. COMMENTARY 
The judgment uses a rather unusual structure, with Pitlay CJ choosing to first outline 
eliminating all peripheral issues arid focusing on the actual application of the plaintiff. 
Unusually it also answc;1S the application first, before moving on to provide 
justification. This is the reverse of many English style judgments, which su.n:ey the case 
law before coming to a conclusion. Aside from the unusual structure, the central 
features of Pillay CJ's judgment are the clear statements of the central principles, the 
reliance on the judgments of similar Courts in other Commonwealth countries and the 
extensive quoting with approval of other judgments. 
3.1.1 Clear Statements of P:tiudple 
A central feature of the judgment of Pillay CJ is his clear elaboration of the principles 
upon which the cow--t bases its conclusions. The jud~1uent ex1ends beyond u'le specific 
facts of the case to establish clear principles governing when a Court sitting in 
~v1auritius has j1uisdiction to intervene in the proceedings of the I"~ational Assembly. 
Instead of d1smissing the case at the point at which he had established that there was no 
23 
constitutional breach, he proceeded to provide a detailed analysis of the Mauritian 
position. 
A good example of the clatiiy of the judgment is found ai ] 78, whefe he fleatly Su.i1rn1ed 
up the role of the court. He commented u1iat:"' 
... liaJ ihi~ Cuwl l.;;;;er; ~atisfied that the alleged breach of the Standing Orders could gi,e rise 
to ari alleged breach of the Constitution, then thjs Court Vv·ould have had the juiisdiction to 
dctcm1ll1c the constitutionaJit:,r· of the djscip!inar:-v· measures taken b:·.: the T'-~ationaJ Assembly 
u.t'1d n·<n.dd iIOt ha;;c bcc11 prevented by s.3 of the Act from doir1g so .. since no Act of the 
1\ zgcmb!y \\J·jch rn not sanctioned by the Constitution should be al!o\vcd to stn..~d. 
While Pi11ay CJ has tendency to write long sentences, the clarity of the writing leaves 
no roon-1 for 1ubi11le1p1daliuu or duubi. 
3.1.2 Judgmeuts ofCouuuouwealth Courts 
A second striking feature of ihe judgmefli is the extensive reliance placed by Pillay CJ 
on u1.e judgments of similar Cou_liiionw·ealth r"",-----' ·-~UlUl::,. He quoted extensively from 
judgments from Papua New Guinea, Canada, the United Kingdom and Jersey, as well as 
using examples from Zimbabwe62, Tonga and South Afiica
63 to iiiustrate specific 
points. This shows a clear acknowledgement of the common legal heritage and history 
of the post-independence countries of the Conunonwealth. 
61 Berenger. abo, e, 178. 
62 Smuh v Mustafa and Another [ J 990] LRC (Const) 87 (Supreme ourt of Zimbabwe). 
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Unlike the United Kingdom, many countries like Mauritius, Tonga and Papua New 
Guinea lack a historical Common Law tradition and constitutional conventions. These 
have been replaced by a written Constitution . While a Constitution provides a clear and 
definite elaboration of the rights and duties of both Government organs and individuals, 
it also brings a different range of legal issues that require resolution . In the absence of 
centuries of history and practice, the Courts of these Commonwealth countries are 
looking to each other to resolve these issues. 
Tfos process has been assisted by the publication of many of these cases in the Law 
Reports of the Commonwealth series. As noted above almost all cases cited come from 
this source. However the case of Danny Phi/lip,64 from the Solomon Islands, which has 
similar facts and adopts a similar position, but was only reported in the Solomon Islands 
Law Reports is not cited in Berenger. This is a good example of the publication of 
judgments affecting the approach of Courts across the Commonwealth. 
3.1.3 Extensive Quoting 
The final formal feature that stands out in the judgment is the way Pillay CJ chooses to 
quote extensively from the judgments of other Courts. In two cases the amount quoted 
occupies over a page of the judgment (Maha65 and :,,y vret66 ). Within these sections the 
key points are underlined, but the extent of the quotations seems unusual compared to 
6
' The Speaker of the National Assembly v P De Li lie and rhe Pan Africanisr Congress of Azam [ 19981 
Case No 297 (Supreme Court of Appeal - SA) 
6
~ Danny Phiflip v The Speaker of rhe Nahonal Parlwmenr I 19901 SJLR 227. 
65 Berenger v Jeewoolal I l 9991 2 MR 172. 181-182. 
66 Berenger, abo\ e, I 84- 185 
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judgments of New Zealand or British Courts. This is partially explained by the 
similarities in Constitutional environments between Mauritius and the countries 
mentioned in the judgrnents. However, it must also indicate that Pillay CJ sees no point 
in restating what others have said adequately before. 
The judgment of Pillay CJ in Berenger is clear and well organised. He presents 
extensive evidence from cases both from Mauritius and the Commonwealth and uses 
them well to support his conclusions. 
3.2 Substantive Elements 
The effect of the judgment in Berenger is to mould the traditional common law doctrine 
of absolute parliamentary privilege to fit the Constitutional environment of Mauritius. 
While Pillay CJ does depart significantly from the common law tradition , it is notable 
that he only departs from the Common Law to the extent necessary to preserve the role 
of the Constitution. He refuses to accept the contention of the applicant that the Court 
should intervene in cases of a breach of the Standing Orders, choosing instead to adopt 
a principle of limited intervention. The Court should only intervene when a breach of 
the Constitution has occurred. However the effect of the judgment should not be 
ignored. This is apparent if the facts of the case of Bradlaugh v Gossett are placed 
within the Mauritian context. 
26 
3.2.1 The Effect of Berenger on Brtullllugh v Gossett 
As mentioned above Bradlaugh is the seminal British case on the absolute right of 
Parliament to exercise its privileges without judicial intervention. In the case 
Bradlaugh, although being a duly elected Member of Parliament, was refused 
permission by the House to take his oath of office and banned from Parliament unless 
he gave an undertaking that he would not attempt to take the oath . The Court of the 
Queen' s Bench refused his application for relief. 67 
If the case of Bradlaugh had occurred in present day Mauritius the result would have 
been completely different. Section 34 of the Constitution of Mauritius outlines the only 
possible reasons for a person being disqualified to be elected as a member. These 
include: insanity; membership of the public service; bankruptcy; and electoral fraud. 68 It 
was clear in Bradlaugh that the plaintiff was duly elected and it is apparent that he 
would not be disqualified from membership by S.34. If Bradlaugh bad been excluded 
from the National Assembly of Mauritius in 2001 and not the House of Commons in the 
1880s, he would have succeeded in his action in the Courts; claiming that the 
Assembly' s exercise of parliamentary privilege had breached his Constitutional rights 
as an elected member. Provided that he could establish the Constitutional breach, under 
the ruling in Berenger, the Court would have the jurisdiction to intervene and ensure 
that his Constitutional right was exercised. 
67 Bradlaugh v Cossell , [ l 88-t] 12 QBD 27 l. 
68 The Constitution or Mauritius, s.34( l)(A)-(H). 
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The substantive effect of the decision in Berenger is to place a limitation on the 
common law doctrine of absolute parliamentary privilege. This grants the Court 
jurisdiction to intervene only in the case of a breach of the Constitution. It reflects the 
Court' s attempt to balance the need for parliamentary independence and a clear 
separation of powers with the status of the Constitution as supreme law. 
4. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
While a similar approach to that of the Supreme Court of Mauritius has also been used 
in Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe and the Solomon lslands,
69 it is not the only 
possible solution to the conflict. The courts in Canada, Australia and Dominica have 
used alternative approaches. While one of these approaches is more conservative than 
that of Berenger (Canada), other Cou1ts have intervened or called for greater 
intervention in parliamentary proceedings (Australia and Dominica). 
4.1 Canada - Speaker of tlte House of Assembly v Canadian Broadcasting 
Commission 
This case concerned an application by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) to 
film the proceedings of the Nova Scotia House of Representatives. The Speaker refused 
this application because it would intrude on the "decorum" of the house.
7° CBC brought 
an action claiming that the Speaker' s decision was in breach of s.2(B) of the Canadian 
Chaiter, which gt1ai·anteed freedom of the Press. The Speaker claimed parliamentaiy 
69 Danny Phillip v The Speaker of the National Parliament [ 19901 SILR 227. 
.. 
-• 
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privilege. Both the trial judge and the appellate division of the Supreme Court of ova 
Scotia agreed with the CBC.
71 However, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the 
opposite. 
A majority of the Court (6-2) held that the Charter did not apply to the exercise of 
parliamentary privilege. McLachlin J delivered the main judgment of the majority. She 
argued that parliamentary privileges "are part of the fimdamental law of our land and 
hence are constitutional".72 Parliamentary privileges have achieved constitutional status 
"on the basis of the preamble of the constitution, historical tradition, and the pragmatic 
principle that the legislature must be presumed to possess such constitutional powers as 
are necessary for their proper fimctionjng".
73 Sbe held that as parhamentary privilege 
"enjoys constitutional status" it "cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of 
the Constitution, in this case the Charter".
74 
By granting parliamentary privilege Constitutional status, the exercise of the privilege is 
freed from the possibility of judicial intervention to enforce any constitutional 
guarantee. The Court in CBC seems to have been particularly persuaded by the policy 
arguments used to justify non-intervention, centrally the necessity of parliamentary 
privileges to the proper functioning of the legislature. However, it seems questionable 
whether a limited jwisdiction for the Courts to enforce constitutional guarantees would 
impact on the functioning of Parliament. This was the position taken by Cory J in his 
70 Speaker of !he House ofAssembly v Canadian Broadcasling Commission (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 2 13 
(Supreme Court of Canada). 
71 Speaker v CBC. abo\ e. 21 6-222. 
72 Speaker v CBC. above. 269. 
73 Speaker v CBC. aborn. 262. 
74 Speaker v CBC, above, 261 . 
---
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dissent. He had no problems applying the Charter to matters of privilege.r The majority 
however remained firmly convinced; to the extent that Cruef Justice Lamer in agreeing 
with the conclusion of McLachlin J held that the House of Representatives was not the 
Legislature, (which was the House plus the Lieutenant-Governor) and hence was not 
covered by the Charter.76 The Charter was only applicable to the Legislature, which did 
not equal the House of Representatives by itself; therefore the Charter could not apply. 
This argument is clearly overly legalistic but may be technically correct. 
4.2 Australia - Egan v Willis 
77 
This case concerned the power of the Legislative Council of ew South Wales to 
request a document from a Cabinet Minister. The plaintiff (Egan) had refused to 
comply with such a request and had been suspended and forcibly removed from the 
house. He challenged the legality of his suspension and removal .
78 This raised three 
questions: whether the Council had the power to request docwnents; whether it had the 
power to suspend a member if a request was refused; and whether the Court could have 
jtrrisdiction. 79 
The High Court of Australia by a majority of 4-1 (McHugh dissenting) ruled that it had 
sufficient jmisdiction to decide whether the parliamentary privilege existed. Only 
McHugh J challenged the justiciability of the matter, commenting that "the common 
law courts will not examine the administration of the law - including statute law -
75 Speaker v CBC. abo, e. 247-258. 
76 Speaker v CBC. above, 237. 
77 Egan v Willis ( 1998) 195 CLR 424 (High Court of Australia). 
78 Egan. above. 456-457. 
79 t;;gan, above. 458. 
• • .. 
• • 
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within the walls of parliament when the matters involved relate only to the internal 
proceedings of parliament".80 Part of the reason why justiciability was not considered a 
big issue stemmed from the fact that "no objection was taken by the principal parties on 
the ground that the dispute was not justiciable". 81 As Kirby J notes the point was only 
raised by the State of South Australia as an intervener in proceedings. 
82 
Only the judgment of Kirby J, among the majority, dealt significantly with the issue of 
justiciability, but his comments make interesting reading. He argues that there is a83 
... further reason in Australia for dismissing the argument of non-justiciability. Courts in this 
country. at least in the scrutiny requirements of the Australian Constitution . ha,e generally 
rejected the notion that they are forbidden by considerations of parliamentary pri, ilege. or of 
the ancient Common Law of parliament. from adjudicating the validity of parliamentary 
conduct where this is to be measured against the Constitution. 
While an initial response to this position may be that it is roughly the same as the 
Supreme Court of Mauritius ' s position in Berenger, it is used by Kirby J and the 
majority to justify substantial intervention into the internal proceedings of Parliament. 
Instead of taking the Bradlaugh approach of acknowledging the right of parliament to 
police its own proceedings, the High Court of Australia actually looks at whether it has 
the right to exercise this privilege in the spec(fic context of a request of docwnents. In 
this respect, the decision extends weJJ beyond that of Berenger, and to some, perilously 
80 Egan. abo,·e. 461. 
81 Egan. above. 485 . 
82 Egan, abo\'e. 487. 
83 Egan, above, 492 . 
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close to reviewing the exercise of parliamentary privilege.R4 Previously the Court had 
been content to establish whether a privilege existed. In tbjs case, they not only 
detennine the exjstence but also examine the actual exercise of the privilege. 
4.3 Dominica - Sabroclte v Speaker oftlte House of Assembly and Anotlter 
85 
The final case that takes a slightly different approach to the issue of parliamentary 
privilege comes from Domiruca. Sabroche was suspended by the House of Assembly for 
criticising a Mnister who abused a farmer ' s group. He appealed to the court to have his 
suspension declared to be unlawful.
86 
The judgment of Redhead JA takes a rather unique approach to the issue of privilege. 
He argued that with87 
(T)he parliament of the Commom,·ealth of Dominica not having passed any legislation as 
provided for under s.41 of the Constitution and the House not having acquired privileges under 
the Common Law by virtue of ancient usage and prescription. the only privileges ... are those 
which are essentially necessary for its functions. 
This is a slightly different situation to Mauritius due to the absence of legislation 
empowering the legislature to police its proceedings. However, the approach of the 
court is an interesting comparison. 
84 See Russell Keith, "Judicial lnten·ention in Parliamentary Proceedings: The Implications of f.gan v 
Willis-- [20001 Federal La,, Re,·ie\\" Vol 28 549-574 for a critique of the High Court approach and an 
endorsement ofMcHugh J'sjudgment. 
85 Sabroche v Speaker of 1he House o_f Assembly and Another [ l 999] 3 LRC 584 (Court of Appeal of 
Dominica) . 
86 Sabroche, aboYe, 586-587. 
87 Sahroche. abO\e. 595 
• 
32 
The judge found that the privilege used to suspend the member was not essential to the 
function of the Assembly and was in breach of the Standing Orders. He felt that in this 
situation "the Court is obliged to act and afford the aggrieved member appropriate 
relief" (emphasis added).
88 Redhead JA concludes that "the Court being the sentinel of 
the Constitution must act and bas a duty to act when any authority acts in non-
confonnity with any rules or Jaws which it derives under the very Constitution" 
( emphasis added). 89 
This mling goes further than either Egan or Berenger. Not only is the Court accepting 
that it has jurisdiction to consider the existence of internal privilege, it also has a 
positive duty to act if the Constitution is breached by the exercise of parliamentary 
privilege. In Berenger the Court would entertain a claim brought on the grounds of a 
breach of a Constitutional right, here the Court is suggesting that it has a duty to 
intervene even if there is no claim, in order to protect the Constitution. The extra step 
taken by the Court does reflect to some extent the facts of the case, where the Plaintiff 
had clearly been innocent of the claims levelled against him, and only guilty of scoring 
a substantiaJ political point against tJ1e government. 
4.4 New Zealand - Prebble v Televi:,ion New Zea/anti 
New ZeaJand' s unwritten constitution pJaces it in a different situation to most other 
Commonwealth countries. The similarity in position between ew Zealand and the 
88 Sabroche, above. 596. 
89 Sabroche. above, 596. 
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United Kingdom has led to a similar approach being adopted in ew Zealand cases to 
that of the British Court. The central case concerning parliamentary privilege in New 
Zealand in recent years is the defamation case of Prebble v Television New Zealand. 
The plaintiff (Prebble) had been Minister of State Owned Enterprise during the 1984-
1990 Labom government. The defendant had aired a programme containing defamatory 
allegations. The defendant wanted to plead the partial defence of truth based on 
parliamentary proceedings. The plaintiff argued that the proceedings were privileged 
and inadmissible. The Court of Appeal agreed but stayed the action because, if allowed 
to proceed, the defendant would not have access to a fair defence.
90 
The Privy CotU1cil in the judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson applied the traditional 
Common Law position as set out in Bradlaugh v Gossett. While the case focussed 
mainly on defamation issues, the Court did consider the issue of privilege in general. 
Lord Browne - Wilkinson concluded that: "so far as the Courts are concerned they will 
not allow any challenge to be made to what is said and done within the walls of 
Parliament in perfonnance of its legislative function and protection of established 
privileges".91 Within a Westminster system of government such as ew Zealand 
parliamentary privilege is supreme. 
90 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd 119941 3 ZLR I. 1-3. 
91 Prebb!e. abo,·e. 7. 
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4.5 The Role of Policy 
The alternative approaches of the different Courts clearly reflect the way that the 
weighing of policy factors affects the way that decisions are reached. Berenger reflects 
the Court' s attempt to balance the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution with 
the independence of Parliament and separation of powers. Conversely, the decision in 
Speaker of the House v CBC shows the Canadian Supreme Court placing a much higher 
value on parliamentary effectiveness and independence at the expense of the role of the 
Charter and the Constitution. The decisions in Sabroche and Egan see the Court citing 
the importance of the Constitution as paramount and placing a lower value on the 
independence of Parliament. 
The central policy consideration in all judgements regardless of whether they allow 
intervention is the necessity of parliamentary privilege. Even in the decision in 
Berenger, which acknowledges that when the Constitu6on has been breached a claim 
can be made, the extent of the claim is severely limited by parliamentary privilege. The 
emphasis of the Court is on giving the parliament maximum independence within the 
limits of the Constitution, rather than on guaranteeing constitutional rights first and 
foremost. This reflects the central position of the doctrine of parliamentary 
independence and the reluctance of the courts to intervene without a clear constitutional 
breach. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Mauritius in the case of Berenger v Jeewoolal 
manages to balance the competing principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and 
absolute parliamentary privilege. This conclusion is based on a developing collection of 
Commonwealth jurisprndence on this issue. This development and its direction are 
clearly influenced by the availability of series such as the Law Reports of the 
Commonwealth . 
Pillay CJ manages to deliver a clear and principled judgment that allows the 
Constitution to function , while retaining much of the independence of Parliament. By 
refusing to intervene in the absence of the breach of the Constitution he allows 
Parliament the maximum possible independence, while retaining the availability of a 
legal challenge should fundamental rights be threatened. This limits the possible 
instances of intervention to the most serious circumstances, thereby granting Parliament 
near complete control and ensuring a clear separation of powers. 
While this approach has proved popular in many similar Commonwealth countries, the 
more conservative approach of Canada and the more radical approaches of Dominica 
and Australia provide an interesting contrast. Both the Dominican and the Australian 
approach show a rejection of the policy arguments advocating complete parliamentary 
independence. Particularly in the Dominican case the emphasis is on the Court to 
uphold the constitution before considering the effect on parliamentary sovereignty. 
36 
The judgement of the Mauritius Supreme Court is carefully reasoned and clearly 
argued. The clear and logical reasoning of the judgement combined with the detailed 
survey of the relevant authorities provides a judgment that gives an excellent guideline 
to future Courts, both in Mauritius and the wider Commonwealth. 
• 
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